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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the study of a class of non-cooperative differential games
in infinite time horizon. Namely, we consider a game with dynamics
x˙ =
n∑
i=1
αi , x(0) = y , (1.1)
where each player acts on his control αi to minimize an exponentially discounted
cost of the form
Ji(α)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)) +
α2i (t)
2
]
dt , (1.2)
both hi being integrable functions, whose smoothness will be addressed later.
Very few results are known on the subject, except in two particular cases: two
players zero-sum games and LQ games (where LQ stands for linear-quadratic).
Indeed, a key step in this kind of problems is the study of the value function u.
In the region where u is smooth, its components satisfy a system of Hamilton-
Jacobi equations (see [7]), and this system is usually difficult to solve.
In the case of two players zero-sum games, since what one player gains is
exactly what the other player loses, the two components of u are one the opposite
of the other. Hence, the Hamilton-Jacobi system (HJ in the following) reduces
to a single equation and one can apply the standard theory of viscosity solutions
(see [1] for more details) to obtain existence and uniqueness results.
In the case of LQ games, the HJ system can be connected to a Riccati system
of ODE for matrices. This system is in general much easier than the original one,
and standard ODE techniques can be applied (see [6] for a detailed treatment).
On the other hand, in the present case both approaches fail and therefore
one has no established techniques to rely on. However, few results still can be
proved.
In the finite horizon setting, the analysis presented in [3, 4] showed that, for
a non-cooperative n-players differential game with general terminal payoffs, the
well-posedness is strongly related with the HJ system being hyperbolic. Namely,
for x ∈ R, thanks to recent advances in the theory of hyperbolic systems of PDE,
games with strictly hyperbolic HJ systems are well-posed. On the other hand,
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it is possible to produce examples of games, even in one spatial dimension,
whose corresponding HJ system is not even weakly hyperbolic and, hence, it is
ill-posed.
A first attempt to study this problem in the infinite horizon setting, for two
players, was made in [2]. The same simple game was considered, and it was
proved that, depending on the monotonicity of the cost functions, very different
situations could arise. Indeed, the HJ system in this case takes the following
form 

u1(x) = h1(x)− u′1u′2 − (u′1)2/2 ,
u2(x) = h2(x)− u′1u′2 − (u′2)2/2 .
(1.3)
But with a system of this form, we can end up with too many solutions.
We find not only value functions u that leads to Nash equilibria in feedback
form, but also solutions that does not represent equilibria of the game. It is
then necessary to introduce a suitable concept of admissibility. In particular
we say that a solution u is admissible, if u is a Carathe´odory solution of (1.3),
which grows at most linearly as |x| → ∞ and satisfies suitable jump conditions
in points where its derivatives are discontinuous. For such a kind of solutions, a
verification theorem was proved: given an admissible solution u and denoted by
u′i the components of its derivatives, then αi = −u′i provide a Nash equilibrium
solution in feedback form.
In [2], it turned out that existence and uniqueness of admissible solution for
(1.3) heavily depend on the choice of the costs.
First, suppose that both the cost functionals are increasing (resp. decreas-
ing). This means that both players would like to steer the game in the same
direction, namely the direction along which their costs decreases. In this case an
admissible solution always exists, and it is also unique, provided a small oscilla-
tions assumption is satisfied. This existence result was in some sense expected,
since this case corresponds, in the finite horizon setting, to the hyperbolic one
studied in [3].
Suppose now that the cost functionals have opposite monotonicity. This
means that the players have conflicting interests, since they would like the game
to go in different directions. In this case it is known, see [4], that the finite
horizon problem is in general ill-posed. On the same line, for our game, it
is enough to consider two linear functionals with opposite slopes (say k,−k,
for any real number k 6= 0) to find infinitely many admissible solutions, and
hence infinitely many Nash equilibria in feedback form. Nevertheless, quite
surprisingly, it’s still possible to recover existence and uniqueness of admissible
solutions to (1.3) in the case of costs that are small perturbation of linear ones,
but with slopes that are not exactly opposite.
This richness of different situations reflects in some sense the results found
in [5]. Indeed, the exact same dynamics was studied, in the finite horizon case,
with only exit costs. Main differences between [5] and [2, 3, 4] lay in the concept
of solution. The authors of [5] look for discontinuous feedback controls that not
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only leads to Nash equilibria, but also satisfies a sort of programming principle.
This resulted in (uncountable) infinitely many solutions, at price of stronger
assumptions on the final costs.
While the cost functionals considered in [2] were a small perturbation of
affine costs, in the present paper we study a wider class of cost functions. Moti-
vated by the theory of hyperbolic systems [?], we now consider piecewise linear
cost functionals, whose derivative has jumps. This setting is a natural first step
towards the analysis of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solutions
for non-linear costs.
Again, as in [2], we reach different results depending on the signs chosen
for h′i. Indeed, as it will be proved in the following sections, if we are in the
cooperative situation for all x, we can still recover a unique admissible solution
for (1.3). On the other hand, any change in the behavior of the costs will
translate in some sort of instability of the game, leading either to infinitely
many admissible solution, or to one unique admissible solution, or even to no
admissible solution at all, only depending on the particular choices of the slopes
h′i.
In conclusion, this great variety of arising situations seems to suggest that
the present approach is not the most suitable one to deal with the intrinsic issues
of the problem. In particular, we can provide examples of very simple differential
games where no Carathe´odory solution with sublinear growth at infinity exists.
Recalling that, in the case of smooth costs (see [2]), this class of solutions was
exactly the right one to find Nash equilibria in feedback form, our study strongly
suggest that a different approach is needed: either to look for Pareto optima,
as in [4], or to introduce some other relaxed concept of equilibrium.
The structure of the present paper is the following. In Section 2 we will
introduce main notations and definitions. Moreover we will recall briefly what
was proved in the case of smooth costs and provide a couple of useful Lemmas.
In Section 3 we will present and prove the main results of this paper, dealing
with cooperative players, in the sense of players whose costs always have the
same monotonicity. In this case existence and uniqueness results hold for both
piecewise linear and piecewise smooth cost functionals. In Section 4 we will
prove that a similar extension is not possible in the case of conflicting interests.
Actually, we will provide an example in which the games has infinitely many
Nash equilibria, as well as an example in which there cannot be any admissible
solution to (1.3). Finally, in Section 5, we will discuss a last case that can arise
when either one or both the cost functionals are allowed to change monotonic-
ity. From this game which is partially “cooperative” (in the sense above) and
partially “conflicting”, infinitely many Nash equilibria can be found.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we consider a scalar 2-persons differential game, with dynamics
x˙ = α1 + α2 , (2.1)
3
x(0) = y . (2.2)
The functions t 7→ αi(t), i = 1, 2, represent the controls implemented by the i-th
player, chosen within a compact set of admissible controls Ai ⊂ R. The game
takes place on [0,+∞[ and each player is subject to a running cost, exponentially
discounted, of the following form
Ji(αi)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)) +
α2i (t)
2
]
dt . (2.3)
Assume here that both hi are piecewise smooth functions with bounded deriva-
tives. Later we will weaken this requirements.
A couple of feedback strategies (α∗1(x), α
∗
2(x)) represents a Nash equilibrium
solution for the game (2.1)–(2.2) if the following holds. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the
feedback control αi = α
∗
i (x) provides a solution to the the optimal control
problem for the i-th player,
min
αi(·)
Ji(αi) , (2.4)
where the dynamics of the system is
x˙ = fi(x, αi) + fj(x, α
∗
j (x)), αi(t) ∈ Ai, j 6= i . (2.5)
More precisely, we require that, for every initial data y ∈ R, the Cauchy problem
x˙ = f1
(
x, α∗1(x)
)
+ f2
(
x, α∗2(x)
)
, x(0) = y , (2.6)
should have at least one Caratheodory solution t 7→ x(t), defined for all t ∈
[0,∞[ . Moreover, for every such solution and each i = 1, . . . ,m, the cost to the
i-th player should provide the minimum for the optimal control problem (2.4)-
(2.5). We recall that a Caratheodory solution is an absolutely continuous func-
tion t 7→ x(t) which satisfies the differential equation in (2.6) at almost every
t > 0.
By the theory of optimal control, see for example [1], we know that if u is
the value function corresponding to (2.1)-(2.2) with costs
Ji(αi)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t ψi
(
x(t), αi(t)
)
dt ,
then, where u is smooth, each component ui should provide a solution to the
corresponding scalar Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The vector function u
thus satisfies the stationary system of equations
ui(x) = Hi(x, u
′
1, u
′
2) , (2.7)
where the Hamiltonian functions Hi are defined as follows. For each p ∈ R,
assume that there exists an optimal control value α∗j (x, p) such that
p · α∗j (x, p) + ψj
(
x, α∗j (x, p)
)
= min
a∈Aj
{
p · a+ ψj(x, a)
}
. (2.8)
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Then
Hi(x, p1, p2)
.
= pi · α∗j (x, pj) + ψi
(
x, α∗i (x, pi)
)
. (2.9)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. In general, even in cases as easy as ψi = α2i /2, this
system will have infinitely many solutions defined on the whole R (see Example 1
in [2]). And not every solution corresponds to a Nash equilibrium for the initial
game. To single out a (hopefully unique) admissible solution, and therefore
a Nash equilibrium for the differential game, additional requirements must be
imposed. Namely a solution u to (2.7) is said to be an admissible solution if the
following holds:
(A1) u is absolutely continuous and its derivative u′ satisfies (2.7) at a.e. point
x ∈ R.
(A2) u has sublinear growth at infinity; namely, there exists a constant C
such that, for all x ∈ R,
∣∣u(x)∣∣ ≤ C (1 + |x|) . (2.10)
(A3) At every point y ∈ R, the derivative u′ admits right and left limits u′(y+),
u′(y−) and at points where u′ is discontinuous, these limits satisfy at least
one of the conditions
u′1(y+) + u
′
2(y+) ≤ 0 or u′1(y−) + u′2(y−) ≥ 0 . (2.11)
Because of the assumption on h′i, the cost functions hi are Lipschitz con-
tinuous. It is thus natural to require the value functions ui to be absolutely
continuous, with sub-linear growth as x → ±∞. The motivation for the as-
sumption (A3) is quite simple. Observing that, in (2.8), the feedback controls
are α∗i = −u′i, the condition (2.11) provides the existence of a local solution to
the Cauchy problem
x˙ = −u′1(x) − u′2(x) , x(0) = y
forward in time. In the opposite case, solutions of the O.D.E. would approach
y from both sides, and be trapped.
Notice that, for 2-players games, the assumptions (A3) is equivalent to
u′1(y+) + u
′
2(y+) ≤ 0 , u′i(y−) = −u′i(y+) (i = 1, 2) . (2.12)
This concept of admissibility turns out to be the right one. Indeed, the
following verification theorem can be proved (see again [2]).
Theorem 1 Consider the differential game (2.1)–(2.2). Let u : R 7→ Rm be
an admissible solution to the systems of H-J equations (2.7), so that the condi-
tions (A1)–(A3) hold. Then the controls α∗i = −u′i provide a Nash equilibrium
solution in feedback form.
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Anyway, this theorem says nothing about the actual existence of admissible
solutions to (2.7). To deal with this problem, some manipulations have to
be done on (2.7) itself. Indeed, in the present case of costs as in (1.2), the
Hamiltonian functions (2.9) lead to

u1(x) = h1(x)− u′1u′2 − (u′1)2/2 ,
u2(x) = h2(x)− u′1u′2 − (u′2)2/2 .
(2.13)
Differentiating (2.13) w.r.t. x and setting pi = u
′
i one obtains the system

h′1 − p1 = (p1 + p2)p′1 + p1p′2 ,
h′2 − p2 = p2p′1 + (p1 + p2)p′2 .
(2.14)
Set
Λ(p)
.
=
(
p1 + p2 p1
p2 p1 + p2
)
, ∆(p)
.
= det Λ(p) ,
and notice that
1
2
(p21 + p
2
2) ≤ ∆(p) ≤ 2(p21 + p22) . (2.15)
In particular, ∆(p) > 0 for all p = (p1, p2) 6= (0, 0). Hence, Λ(p) is invertible
outside the origin and, for p 6= (0, 0), we can restrict the study to the equivalent
system {
p′1 = ∆(p)
−1
[− p21 + (h′1 − h′2)p1 + h′1p2] ,
p′2 = ∆(p)
−1
[− p22 + (h′2 − h′1)p2 + h′2p1] . (2.16)
Now define a new variable s such that ds/dx = ∆(p)−1. Using s as a new
independent variable, we write pi = pi(s) and hi = hi(x(s)) and study the
equivalent system 

d
ds
p1 = (h
′
1 − h′2)p1 + h′1p2 − p21 ,
d
ds
p2 = (h
′
2 − h′1)p2 + h′2p1 − p22 .
(2.17)
We underline that it is possible to choose the rescaling in order to map 0 to
0. This choice will be assumed in the following, so that s(0) = 0.
In this new variable, as it was proved [2], every unbounded trajectory p(s)
of (2.17) actually blows up at finite so, and it corresponds to an unbounded
trajectory p(x) that tends to ∞ as |x| → ∞. Since∣∣∣∣dxds
∣∣∣∣ = ∆(p(s)) ≥ co(so − s)2 ,
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it follows that u(x) increases more than linearly as x→∞. Therefore, u is not
admissible.
It remains to consider trajectories of (2.17) that tend to the origin, i.e. to
the point where our change of variables is singular. In [2] it was proven that,
by (2.15), these solutions satisfy∣∣∣∣dxds
∣∣∣∣ = ∆(p(s)) = O(1) · e−2co|s| .
In the original variable x, to the whole trajectory s 7→ p(s) there corresponds
only a portion of trajectory x 7→ p(x), say either for x ∈ ]xo,∞[ or x ∈ ] −
∞, xo[. Another trajectory s 7→ pˆ(s) has to be constructed to extend the solution
to all x ∈ R.
For the system (2.17), in the case of smooth functions h1, h2 such that |h′i(x)| ≤
C, we already know the following results (see [2]):
Theorem 2 Let the cost functions h1, h2 be smooth, and assume that their
derivatives satisfy
1
C
≤ h′i(x) ≤ C
for some constant C > 1 and all x ∈ R. Then the system (2.13) has an ad-
missible solution and the corresponding functions α∗i = −u′i provide a Nash
equilibrium solution to the non-cooperative game (2.1)-(2.2). Assume moreover
that the oscillation of their derivatives satisfies
sup
x,y∈R
∣∣h′i(x)− h′i(y)∣∣ ≤ δ , i = 1, 2
for some δ > 0 sufficiently small (depending only on C). Then the admissible
solution is also unique.
Theorem 3 Let any two constants κ1, κ2 be given, with
κ1 < 0 < κ2 , κ1 + κ2 6= 0 .
Then there exists δ > 0 such that the following holds. If h1, h2 are smooth
functions whose derivatives satisfy∣∣h′1(x) − κ1∣∣ ≤ δ , ∣∣h′2(x) − κ2∣∣ ≤ δ ,
for all x ∈ R, then the system of H-J equations (2.17) has a unique admissible
solution.
In this paper, we want to look for admissible solutions when smoothness
of functions hi is relaxed. Namely we consider functions hi that are piecewise
linear, with a finite number of discontinuity in their derivatives. In other words
we require that there exists a finite subdivision
xo = −∞ < x1 < . . . < xN < xN+1 = +∞
7
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of [−∞,+∞] and two (N + 1)-tuple of constants (κ1i , . . . , κN+1i ), i = 1, 2, such
that
h′i(x) = κ
j
i if x ∈ ]xj , xj+1[ i = 1, 2, j = 0, . . . , N . (2.18)
Could be of use to remark that this assumption on h′i means that the sys-
tem (2.17) follows different dynamics in each interval Ij .= ]xj , xj+1[: indeed,
in each Ij , (2.17) will have an equilibrium in (0, 0) and a second one in the point
Kj = (κj1, κ
j
2).
We also introduce the following notation (see Figure 1)
Ai =
{
ρ(cos θ, sin θ) ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣ ρ > 0, θ ∈ ](i− 1)π4 , iπ4
[ }
, (2.19)
to label regions in R2, where we put our non-zero equilibria Kj = (κj1, κ
j
2).
Finally, we state a couple of easy properties we will need in the following.
They provide expressions for both eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the system
obtained linearizing (2.17) around the origin. These expressions were already
found in [2], and they follow from simple linear algebra.
Proposition 1 The linearized system near (0, 0), corresponding to (2.17), has
the following form(
p′1
p′2
)
= H ·
(
p1
p2
)
, H =
(
κ1 − κ2 κ1
κ2 κ2 − κ1
)
. (2.20)
Moreover the eigenvalues of the matrix H are
λ− = −
√
(κ1)2 + (κ2)2 − κ1κ2 , λ+ =
√
(κ1)2 + (κ2)2 − κ1κ2 , (2.21)
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with corresponding eigenvectors
v− =
(
1,
κ2 − κ1 −
√
(κ1)2 + (κ2)2 − κ1κ2
κ1
)
,
v+ =
(
1,
κ2 − κ1 +
√
(κ1)2 + (κ2)2 − κ1κ2
κ1
)
.
(2.22)
One can immediately see that the eigenvectors in (2.22) depend actually by the
ratio between κ2 and κ1 only. Moreover it turns out that this kind of dependence
is indeed monotone increasing, as proved in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Set α = κ2
κ1
. Then the directions corresponding to the eigenvec-
tors v− and v+ are given (respectively) by the maps
G−(α) :


] 0,∞ [ → ]− 2,−1
2
[
α 7→ α− 1−√α2 − α+ 1
g−(α) :


]−∞, 0 [ → ]−∞,−2 [
α 7→ α− 1−√α2 − α+ 1
G+(α) :


] 0,∞ [ → ] 0,∞ [
α 7→ α− 1 +√α2 − α+ 1
g+(α) :


]−∞, 0 [ → ]− 1
2
, 0 [
α 7→ α− 1 +√α2 − α+ 1
depending on the sign of α (and hence of κ1 · κ2). These maps satisfy
d
dα
G− > 0 ,
d
dα
G+ > 0 ,
d
dα
g− > 0 ,
d
dα
g+ > 0 .
(2.23)
Proof. The properties follow from
G′−(α) = g
′
−(α) = 1−
2α− 1
2
√
α2 − α+ 1 =
√
(2α− 1)2 + 3− (2α− 1)
2
√
α2 − α+ 1 > 0 ,
G′+(α) = g
′
+(α) = 1 +
2α− 1
2
√
α2 − α+ 1 =
√
(2α− 1)2 + 3 + (2α− 1)
2
√
α2 − α+ 1 > 0 ,
and from
lim
α→0+
G−(α) = lim
α→0−
g−(α) = −1− 1 = −2 ,
9
PSfrag replacements
p1
p2
K
Figure 2
lim
α→0+
G+(α) = lim
α→0−
g+(α) = −1 + 1 = 0 ,
lim
α→+∞
G−(α) = lim
α→+∞
− α
α− 1 +
√
(α− 1)2 + α = −
1
2
,
lim
α→−∞
g+(α) = lim
α→−∞
− α
α− 1−
√
(α− 1)2 + α = −
1
2
,
lim
α→+∞
G+(α) = +∞ ,
lim
α→−∞
g−(α) = −∞ .

3 Cooperative Situation
We start considering allKj = (κj1, κ
j
2) in A1∪A2. Notice that a similar analysis,
with straightforward adaptations, can be done if the Kj are in A5 ∪ A6. This
choice implies that our system follows the dynamics depicted in Figure 2.
Theorem 4 Let the cost functions h1, h2 be as in (2.3), and assume that the
constants (κj1, κ
j
2) are all chosen in A1 ∪ A2. Then the system (2.13) has a
unique admissible solution and the corresponding functions α∗i = −u′i provide a
Nash equilibrium solution to the non-cooperative game (2.1)-(2.2).
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Proof. Existence. The existence of an admissible solution is very easy to
prove. Indeed, it is enough to glue together pieces of admissible solutions in
each interval Ij . We proceed as follows:
• in Io, we set po ≡ Ko = (κo1, κo2);
• for j ≥ 1, in Ij we set pj the unique solution of the Cauchy problem
for (2.17) with initial datum p(s(xj)) = p
j−1(s(xj)). Since the set
Γj =
{
(p1, p2)
∣∣ p1, p2 ∈ [0, 2C1], p1 + p2 ≥ C2
2
}
,
where
C1 = max{κj1, κj2,
pj−11 (s(xj))
2
,
pj−12 (s(xj))
2
} ,
C2 = min{κj1, κj2, pj−11 (s(xj)) + pj−12 (s(xj))} ,
is positively invariant for (2.17), each pj will exists up to s(xj+1) without
reaching (0, 0) and remaining bounded;
Then, it is well defined the continuous function p¯ given by p¯(x) = pj(x) when-
ever x ∈ Ij . Its admissibility is an immediate consequence of its continuity and
the admissibility of each pj .
Uniqueness. To prove that the solution built above is the unique admissible
solution to (2.17), we start proving uniqueness on Io.
We know from [2] that, for s negative small enough (eventually for s→ −∞),
the only solutions that remain bounded are the equilibrium Ko itself and the
unstable orbits exiting from the origin. Therefore, these are the unique possible
choices, in order to retaain admissibility. If we choose an unstable orbit in place
of Ko, in the original variable x it would correspond to a solution defined only
for x > xo (for a suitable xo). To define the solution also for x < xo, we should
need a solution to 

p′1 = (κ
o
1 − κo2)p1 + κo1p2 − p21 ,
p′2 = (κ
o
2 − κo1)p2 + κo2p1 − p22 ,
that tends to the origin as s → +∞ and remains bounded for all negative s.
But we know from [2] that no solution with both these properties exists. Hence
the uniqueness of the solution follows on Io.
For s > s(x1), the smoothness of the right hand side of (2.17) in each interval
Ij ensures that p¯ is the unique continuous solution.
It remains to prove that there exists no solution with admissible jumps in
s > s(x1). But this property follows from (2.12) and from the positive invariance
of the sets
Γ+
.
=
{
(p1, p2) ∈ R2
∣∣p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥ 0} ,
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Γ−
.
=
{
(p1, p2) ∈ R2
∣∣p1 ≤ 0, p2 ≤ 0} .
Indeed, for s > s(x1) a solution can have only jumps from Γ
+ to Γ−. Hence,
recalling [2], after a first jump the solution would be forced to remain in Γ−
and to tend towards ∞. In the x variable, this would translate into a solution
u(x) that grows more than linearly as |x| → ∞, and this would contradict
admissibility. 
In light of Theorem 4, on the same line of [2], it is natural to ask whether
the result still hold for perturbations of (2.3) or it fails. Actually, we can prove
the following Theorem.
Theorem 5 Let the cost functions h′1, h
′
2 in (2.3) be smooth, and assume that:
(1) their derivatives satisfy
1
C
≤ h′i(x) ≤ C
for some constant C > 1 and all x ∈ R;
(2) on Io, the following additional assumption is satisfied
sup
ξ,η∈Io
∣∣h′i(ξ)− h′i(η)∣∣ ≤ δ i = 1, 2. (3.1)
for some δ > 0 sufficiently small (depending only on C).
Then the system (2.13) has a unique admissible solution.
Proof. We can proceed as in Theorem 4, using Theorem 2 to deal with the
perturbations. Indeed, for s < s(x1) Theorem 2 implies that there exists a
unique admissible solution, say po. Hence, an admissible solution on the whole
real line can be built as in the previous case: for x ∈]xj , xj+1[, j ≥ 1, we
define p(x) = pj(x) where pj is the unique solution to (2.13) with initial datum
p(s(xj)) = p
j−1(s(xj)). Exactly as in Theorem 4, this function is well defined
and is a continuous admissible solution to (2.17). Since the sets Γ+ and Γ− are
still positively invariant, also uniqueness can be proved by means of the same
arguments used in Theorem 4. 
Remark 1 We underline that the presence of the small oscillations assump-
tion (3.1) is uniquely motivated by the use of Theorem 2, which requires (3.1)
to provide a unique admissible solution for s < s(xo).
4 Conflicting interests
In this section we assume that the two players have conflicting interests, i.e.
their costs satisfy h′1(x) · h′2(x) < −C < 0 for all x ∈ R. For particular choices
of smooth costs, this situation can produce infinitely many Nash equilibria to
12
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the game (see [2]). Nevertheless Theorem 3 shows that, for costs which are
not exactly opposite and under suitable assumptions of small oscillations, it is
possible to recover existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. This is not the
case for costs as in (2.3).
4.1 Case 1
Let us consider j = 1 in (2.3), i.e. let us consider cost functionals that have a
single jump in their derivatives. In particular, assume this jump is located at
x = s(x) = 0. Moreover, let us choose the constants Kj = (κj1, κ
j
2), j = 0, 1, so
that Ko ∈ A4 and K1 ∈ A3.
Under these assumptions, the dynamics followed by the system are depicted in
Figure 3 (for x < 0) and Figure 4 (for x > 0). We now prove that we could
find infinitely many solutions to our problem. Indeed, consider an initial datum
pin = (pin1 , p
in
2 ) such that p
in
1 +p
in
2 = 0 and p
in
1 < 0 < p
in
2 . Recalling Proposition 2
and setting αo =
κo2
κo
1
, α1 =
κ12
κ1
1
, we have
g−(α
1) < −2 < −1 = p
in
2
pin1
< −1
2
< g+(α
o) ,
i.e. pin belongs to the region between the stable orbit for the negative system
(say γ−S ) and the unstable one for the positive system (say γ
+
U ), provided it’s
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been chosen sufficiently near the origin. Therefore to any choice of pin there
corresponds an admissible solution tending respectively to either K1 or Ko as
s→ ±∞.
Moreover, if the unstable orbit for the dynamics in Figure 3 (say γ−U ) intersects
the stable one for the dynamics in Figure 4 (say γ+S ), we can obtain an additional
solution considering as initial datum that point of intersection. Indeed the
function given by the juxtaposition of γ−U and γ
+
S corresponds, in the original
variable x, to a solution defined on a bounded interval [x−, x+], with x− < 0 <
x+ by the choice of the rescaling. This solution can then be extended to an
admissible trajectory defined on the whole real line by using γ−S for x < x− and
γ+U for x > x+.
Remark 2 The same construction can be applied when Ko ∈ A8 and K1 ∈ A7.
4.2 Case 2
Now we want to show, by means of a second example, how a simple change
between the positive and negative behaviors of the costs, can lead to completely
different result. Namely, we consider costs with a single jump in their deriva-
tives, located in x = s(x) = 0, and Ko ∈ A3, K1 ∈ A4. This choice produce a
game with no admissible solutions to (2.17).
We proceed by contradiction. Assume that an admissible solution p˜ = (p˜1, p˜2)
exists, for a Cauchy problem with initial datum p˜(0) = pin. Then, recalling the
14
results in [2], we have that
lim
s→+∞
|p˜(s)| < +∞
actually implies
lim
s→+∞
|p˜(s)| = 0 ,
and hence p˜ is one of the stable orbits of the positive system. Now we underline
that this means pin /∈ γ+U . Then, we can repeat the proof of Theorem 3, given
in [2], and find
lim
s→so+
|p˜(s)| = +∞ ,
for a suitable so < 0, eventually so = −∞. Therefore the solution cannot be
admissible, and we have a contradiction.
Notice that the previous calculations hold even if the unstable orbit for the
dynamics in Figure 3 (say γ−U ) intersects the stable one for the dynamics in
Figure 4 (say γ+S ). This means there is no solution as the one built in the
previous case, using more trajectories in the s variable: this is obviously due to
the fact that we cannot find solutions bounded at +∞ (resp. −∞) to extend a
possible p˜ when x > x+ (resp. x < x−).
Remark 3 The same result can be obtained when Ko ∈ A7 and K1 ∈ A8.
Remark 4 Actually, one can still construct particular cases so that there exist
admissible solutions. Fixed Ko,K1 as above, assume that the trajectories γ−U
and γ+S intersect in a point. Moreover, set x− and x+ the values introduced in
the previous example, ℓ = |x+−x−| and Jn =]x−+nℓ, x++nℓ[, n ∈ Z. We can
define piecewise linear costs on the whole R by repeating on each Jn the same
2-value piecewise linear cost. In other words, ∀n ∈ Z set
h′i(x)
∣∣Jn =
{
κoi if x ∈ ]x− + nℓ, nℓ[
κ1i if x ∈ ]nℓ, x+ + nℓ[
i = 1, 2, (4.1)
Then, we find a solution by simply gluing together periodically γ−U and γ
+
S . This
solution is admissible, being bounded in the p1, p2 plane.
Anyway no general results as Theorem 3 is possible.
5 Mixed Cases
In this section we end our presentation of ill-posed problems, with a last example
presenting costs that can switch from a situation with conflicting interests into
a cooperative one. More precisely, we consider costs with a single jump in their
derivative, located again in x = s(x) = 0, and Ko ∈ A5 ∪ A6, K1 ∈ A1 ∪ A2.
Moreover, let us assume
α1 =
κ12
κ11
6= κ
o
2
κo1
= αo . (5.1)
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With these assumptions, the system follows the dynamics depicted in Figure 5
(resp. Figure 2) for x < 0 (resp. x > 0) and Ko,K1 are not on the same line
through the origin.
Again, we observe the existence of infinitely many Nash equilibria. Assume
it holds αo < α1 in (5.1) (the opposite inequality leading to a similar analysis).
Then, we can consider the non-empty region
Ω =
{
(p1, p2) ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣ p1 < 0 < p2, G−(αo) < p2p1 < G−(α1)
}
.
This region is, at least near the origin, say in a neighborhood O, exactly the
region between the stable orbit for the positive system and the unstable one for
the negative system. Taking as initial datum any point pin both in Ω and in O,
we can construct an admissible solution in the following way. We take for s < 0
the unique solution to the negative system, passing through pin at s = 0 and
tending to Ko as s → −∞. In an analogous way, we take for s > 0 the unique
solution to the positive system, passing through pin at s = 0 and tending to
K1 as s → +∞. Every such a solution, being continuous and bounded in s,
corresponds to an admissible solution u(x).
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